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Abstract International law is being challenged by a multitude of new actors and
networks that do not fit within the traditional Westphalian system. Similarly, security
is increasingly undermined by, for example, economic, health, and environmental
threats that can affect individuals’ daily lives and know no state boundaries. This is the
kaleidoscopic world as outlined by Edith Brown Weiss. The concept of ‘human
security’ has been advanced to inform decision-making on threats to security in the
interest of individuals in a bottom-up manner. This article looks forward to methods
that can counter what could be perceived as a legitimacy crisis in international law.
First, some of the current challenges which international law faces are explained
ranging from globalisation, the declining state-based order, and decentralised security
threats. Second, the concept of human security is defined, and its contents expounded.
Lastly, the thesis is advanced that a conceptual framework of human security can
reorientate international law to be responsive to the kaleidoscopic world by using UN
peace operations as an example of where human security could have a profound
impact.
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1 Introduction
Global issues are increasingly kaleidoscopic to the extent that interna-
tional law is undermined by a multitude of new actors and networks
that do not fit within the traditional Westphalian system. Similarly,
security is increasingly threatened by, for example, cross-border threats
of violence, health, environmental crises, and more that become
intertwined, can affect individuals’ daily lives, and are not halted by
traditional state boundaries. For instance, terrorism in the Sahel, famine
in Nigeria, the spread of viruses such as Ebola and Coronavirus, and the
displacement of the Rohingya are a few examples from recent years
where a broad notion of security has been undermined. International
law fails to adequately respond to these challenges and implement new,
bottom-up approaches where the international community is responsive
to the needs identified by individuals.
This article understands the world to be ‘‘kaleidoscopic’’, as argued by
Edith Brown Weiss, where the actors and coalitions engaging in the
international system are constantly changing.1 Developments are swift
where crises can appear and quickly cross borders amidst an ever-
connected world linked through information technology. Brown Weiss
stresses that international law more than ever needs to be viewed as
legitimate by both those who create it, importantly states, and those
affected by it.2 This is because in recent years there has been
unprecedented backlash against the international system, and more
broadly globalisation, by states. Well known examples of this trend
include the sceptical voice of President Donald Trump, the UK’s
referendum to leave the European Union, and the global rise in
nationalist politics. In addition, globalisation and access to information
technology has resulted in the spread of fake news, unprecedented
monitoring of individuals by states, more visible economic inequalities,
and the contraction of space for civil society.3
The concept of ‘human security’ can be used as a conceptual
framework to allow international law to better focus its attention on the
individual and be responsive to the needs of persons affected by
1 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Establishing Norms in a Kaleidoscopic World’ (2019) 396 Recueil des Cours de
l’Académie de Droit International; Edith BrownWeiss, ‘On Being Accountable in a Kaleidoscopic World’ (2010)
104 American Society of International Law Proceedings 477; Edith Brown Weiss, ‘International Law in a
Kaleidoscopic World’ (2011) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 21.




insecurity. The term ‘‘human security’’ is used throughout the article to
denote the non-legal concept as espoused by both the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) and Commission on Human Security which will
be expounded in Sect. 3.4 It is argued that international actors,
particularly the UN, would be able to utilise human security to advance
a human-centred approach to international law and specifically,
international peace and security. Human security would provide for
the participation of a diverse range of non-state actors who previously
have been unable or find it incredibly difficult to permeate the
international system. By doing so the international system will remain
relevant in this time of rapid change and pushback against the prevailing
international order. The example of UN peace operations is used to
demonstrate how a human security approach could positively influence
the practice of the UN and their state partners toward the inclusion of
individuals as participants. The approach argued for in this article does
not purport to be a panacea that will enable a reformulation of
international law in an iconoclastic manner.5 Nor does this article
address the full range of discussions that can be had such as, how such a
conceptual framework would be implemented, how a human security
approach fits within scholarship from Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) and also how human security relates to
liberal peace, but there is not the space in one article to address these
questions. Instead, the article aims to generate debate and future critical
examination of how international law can accommodate for a rapidly
interconnected and globalised world.
2 The kaleidoscopic world, security and the legitimacy
of international law
Individuals are not typically included in the making of international law
or the decision-making of states and the normative international system
has little scope for accommodating non-state actors in general.6 Instead
the international system is viewed through the prism of geography, due
4 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (OUP 1994); Commission on Human Security, Human Security
Now (New York 2003).
5 For an iconoclastic take see Matthew Nicholson, Re-Situating Utopia (Brill 2019).
6 Andrew Clapham, ‘The Role of the Individual in International Law’ (2010) 21 European Journal of
International Law 25–30. For more expansive studies of the international legal personality of individuals see,
Kate Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System (Cambridge University Press 2011); Astrid
Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, The International Legal Personality of the Individual (OUP 2018).
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to the principles of sovereignty and equality of (territorial) states, and
the question is whether such a state-based, geographic approach is
relevant in the twenty first century.7 On the one hand it is claimed that
state sovereignty will remain relevant over the coming decades.8
However, Daniel Bethlehem has argued that,
[w]hile the geography of statehood is likely to remain at the root of the
international system, it is becoming increasingly less important as people, goods,
services, and funds flow across borders; as individuals and corporations engage
directly with one another without the intermediation of states or of their
paraphernalia; as virtual space takes on dimensions and an importance that rivals
physical space in the world of transactions, communications, and other
engagements; as regional and multilateral integration arrangements between
states reduce the importance of boundaries; as international and non-govern-
mental organizations proliferate and operate transnationally on the basis of
technical mandates that transcend, or endeavour to transcend, narrow sovereign
interests.9
The international system has, in practice, become progressively about
attempting to regulate a diverse range of both public and private actors
interacting across the globe regardless of state borders.
What is true is that international law has undergone a process of
‘‘humanization’’.10 For instance, Ruti Teitel’s concept of ‘‘humanity’s
law’’ provides a framework for the international community to
recognise the interests of a multitude of actors, including individuals.11
In a similar vein, Anne Peters has identified that ‘law ultimately should
be guided and justified by the concerns of the persons affected by
them.’12 Peters argues in her expansive study that ‘an orientation
towards the individual in communities justifies international law as a
whole.’13 When examining the subjects of international law, Rosalyn
Higgins rejects the notion that only states can be subjects as a legal
fiction.14 Higgins advocates a view that individuals are participants in
the international legal system but notes how individuals are ‘extremely
7 Daniel Bethlehem, ‘The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International System and the
Challenge to International Law’ (2014) 25 European Journal of International Law 9–24, 10–1.
8 Aurel Sari and Agnieszka Jachec-Neale, ‘International Law in 2050’ (ECIL Occasional Paper 2018/1)
\https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180686[ 13.
9 Bethlehem, supra note 7, 15.
10 See e.g. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of International (Martinus Nijhoff 2006); Antônio Augusto
Cançado Trindade, International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Jus Gentium (Brill 2010 1st ed).
11 Ruti Teitel, Humanity’s Law (OUP 2011) 216. See also, 139–165.
12 Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights: The Legal Status of the Individual in International Law (CUP 2016) 553
13 Ibid. 554.
14 See Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (OUP 1994) 48–55.
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handicapped’ with little access to the international arena.15 In the
subsequent sections, this article will propose a framework which
encourages both access to the international system by individuals and
for their interests to be at the forefront of decision-making.
The author agrees with Peters that international law requires an
orientation towards the individual to remain legitimate and this article
sets out a possible method of achieving such an orientation for
international peace and security. Consequently, the focus of this paper is
on the implications of a globalised and interconnected world on
individual security as opposed to the general ‘humanization’ of
international law. Law in general exists to both protect and regulate
values we deem worthy, one of which is security. Security is an ‘elastic
and dynamic concept’ and can be understood in a variety of different
ways.16 One very broad definition of security is that it means the
absence of threats.17 Conventionally, the referent object of security has
been the state. That is to say, if the state is able to maintain safety and
order internally and is sufficiently capable of repelling external threats
then those living within the state are also perceived to be secure. Since
the Second World War the notion of security has been liberalised to
become denationalised and both globalised and individualised.18 There
has been increased attention given to a human-centric concept of
security where the absence of threats for individuals, not only the state
as a whole, has been given increased value. The rise in interventions by
the UN Security Council, the creation of the international human rights
law system, the codification of and enforcement of humanitarian law,
UN agencies focused on global security and development, amongst
other advancements have brought a postmodern concept of security to
the forefront where the individual is the referent object of security, not
the state. Nevertheless, a state-centric view of security remains present
and states pursue their own global security goals with little regulation
which may detract from the security of individuals.
Traditionally, the state was able to respond effectively to crises within
its own borders and the state was the primary provider of security. The
15 Ibid. 51.
16 Hitoshi Nasu, ‘Human Security and International Law’ In: Mary E Footer, Julia Schmidt, Nigel D
White and Lydia Davies-Bright, Security and International Law (Hart 2016) 28.
17 Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’ (1991) 17 Review of International Studies 313, 319.
18 Christopher Daase, ‘‘‘National, Societal’’, and ‘‘Human Security’’: On the Transformation of Political
Language’ (2010) 35(4) Historical Social Research 22, 34. See also, Cornel Zwierlein, Rüdiger Graf, ‘The
Production of Human Security in Premodern and Contemporary History’ (2010) 34(4) Historical Social
Research 7.
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reality today is that in an increasingly globalised world an action or
event in one state can either rapidly have ramifications elsewhere in the
globe or a crisis that would once have been isolated can cut to the very
core of a person’s ability to survive.19 The global value of security can
thus no longer be purely regulated by states. Advocacy groups and
coalitions can form on the internet nearly instantly and dissolve just as
fast. Issues can trend on Twitter in an instant bringing the concerns of a
previously isolated community to global attention and disappear just
hours later. However, the discourse on social media can also be seized
upon by persons, either locally or from overseas, seeking to undermine
the credibility of a crisis. Those persons can easily and rapidly spread
pernicious misinformation that threatens local communities.20 One
potent example is the use of WhatsApp in India to spread misinfor-
mation, which has led to a number of deaths and violent attacks since
2015, but notably hitting a peak in 2018.21 It is increasingly difficult for
states to regulate online activities and rapidly shared misinformation can
quickly create a security crisis.
Climate change, for example, could be at the root of a food scarcity
crisis in sub-Saharan Africa that then results in violence threatening the
physical integrity of communities and massive internal displacement of
persons. Such a crisis could cross-borders, create a storm of both
accurate and false reports on social media, and ultimately at the centre
of the situation are individuals seeking security, likely in the form of
protection and assistance, from either their government or the wider
international community. In a kaleidoscopic world a sub-national or
national crisis can rapidly become a global security issue. For instance,
where refugees flee a situation in their home country irrespective of
state borders the security problem trickles over into other states and is
no longer contained. The situation then becomes a topic of worldwide
debate in news media and social media platforms where a variety of
stakeholders are able to reach out globally to have their voices heard.
Brown Weiss argues the international legal system will need to adapt to
19 Bethlehem has noted that there are considerable cross-border challenges related to public health, the
environment and food security in light of how transboundary the world has become. See Bethlehem, supra
note 7, 16–7.
20 Edith Brown Weiss, ‘The Emerging International System and Sustainable Development’ (2000) 1
International Review for Environmental Strategies 9, 11; Brown Weiss 2011, supra note 1, 29–30.
21 For a recent study on WhatsApp usage in India and the link to the attacks see Shakuntala Banaji and
Ram Bhat, ‘WhatsApp Vigilantes: An exploration of citizen reception and circulation of WhatsApp





both respond to these changes and cater for new stakeholders to remain
relevant and legitimate.22
Not only is the world increasingly kaleidoscopic but the international
legal system is suffering from both international norm fatigue and
backlash. An example given by James Crawford is the UK’s dispute over
the finding of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in
relation to Julian Assange in 2016.23 A few of the plethora of examples
of norm fatigue and backlash include: the unclear status of Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations; US withdrawal
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); Russian unsigning of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; the campaign of the
African Union against the International Criminal Court which has led to
high profile cases of withdrawal, and later rescinding of the with-
drawals, from the Rome Statute including Burundi, The Gambia and
South Africa; the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; and the US withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement. The Russian seizure of Crimea is a potent
example of how the tides have shifted since post-Cold War liberalism in
international affairs during the 1990s towards rejection of the norms
that underpin the international legal system.24 Coupled with backlash is
dissatisfaction with international standard-setting such as scepticism
surrounding the economic liberalisation agendas of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and
apprehension over increased Security Council activism.25
There has been gradual disengagement of some nations with the
international system which can possibly affect the so-called sedimentary
formations of international law. Crawford explains that states can
remove some layers of international law’s sedimentary formation, but
some are more difficult to erode.26 For example, top layers of
multilateral treaties can be easily affected by states, for instance by
choosing to withdraw, but the solid base of the sediment, the principles,
norms and institutions, are more difficult to erode even amid the
current political discourse. Current disengagement and backlash though
does not only extend to treaties. Instead it also includes the UN, part of
22 Brown Weiss 2019, supra note 1.
23 James Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’ (2018) 81 Modern Law
Review 1, 5–6.
24 See e.g. Phillip Remler, ‘OSCE Mediation in an Eroding International Order’ (2016) 27 Security and
Human Rights 273.
25 Richard Collins, The Institutional Problem in Modern International Law (Hart 2016) 223.
26 Crawford, supra note 23, 21.
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the sediment’s solid base. For example, US foreign policy under the
Trump administration has led to funding cuts of over half a billion US
dollars proudly stated as only the start by the then US Ambassador to
the UN, Nikki Haley, on Twitter.27 The US displeasure with the UN
came to head in December 2017 with attempts to coerce states in the
General Assembly to vote against what they saw as an anti-US/Israel
resolution declaring US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital as
null and void with no legal effect.28 Ambassador Haley warned that she
would be ‘taking names’ of states who vote in opposition to the US.29
Similar to the demands of the kaleidoscopic world, Crawford argues
that international law will only survive if it manages to transform and
develop over time.30 The changing attitude of states towards interna-
tional law is a concurrent trend that will ultimately affect the
functioning of the UN in combatting increasingly linked threats that
affect the core of individual’s lives. A return ‘‘back to Westpahlia’’ to
address the legitimacy crisis of international law has been described by
Richard Collins as deeply unpopular.31 Instead, what is needed is ‘to
ensure that international law reflects shared values that bind people
together and that it provides processes that all regard as fair and as
ensuring accountability by states, non-state actors, and the myriad of
other actors, especially individuals.’32 Collins explains that the direct
participation of individuals in international law-making is a chimera and
that ‘the only plausible prospect appears to be to enhance the
participatory role and normative influence of NGOs and other non-
state actors as a nascent form of ‘‘global civil society’’.’33 Nevertheless,
participation of the kaleidoscopic world’s growing range of non-state
actors, whether that be individuals or civil society groups who are more
visible than ever, is crucial and this article argues the international
system requires a new framework which can assist with
27 Julian Egan, ‘US funding cuts to UN agencies would be costly for peace and security’ (The Guardian, 31
Janaury 2017) \https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jan/31/un-funding-cuts-us-
trump-administration[; Nikki Haley, ‘‘Just 5 months into our time here, we’ve cut over half a billion $$$
from the UN peacekeeping budget & we’re only getting started.’’ [Twitter post, @AmbNikkiHaley], 29 June
2017\https://twitter.com/nikkihaley/status/880232833322713088[.
28 UN General Assembly, ‘Status of Jerusalem’ (19 December 2017) A/ES-10/L.22.
29 Peter Beaumont, ‘US will ’take names of those who vote to reject Jerusalem recognition’ (The
Guardian, 20 December 2017) \https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/20/us-take-names-
united-nations-vote-to-reject-jerusalem-recognition[.
30 Crawford, supra note 23, 22.
31 Collins, supra note 25, 240.
32 Brown Weiss 2011, supra note 1, 32.
33 Collins, supra note 25, 241.
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accommodating those actors and refocus the attention of international
actors toward inclusive decision-making processes. The following
section will outline the content of human security which can serve as
a conceptual framework for international law to be responsive to the
kaleidoscopic world.
3 What is human security?
The concept of human security seeks to respond to new interlinkages in
peoples’ lives and can allow international law to react to the changing
demands of a world where movements and the concerns of local people
can be communicated across the globe in an instant. Human security
has two key elements: (1) it aims to shift the referent object of security
from the state to the individual giving the individual intrinsic value and
placing the interests of the individual ahead of the state; (2) it gives rise
to a broader view on what can cause insecurity and that many threats
are interconnected and reinforcing.34 Past initiatives had attempted to
draw attention to the linkages between peace and development and
called on the international community to consider more than only
traditional threats to peace. For instance, the Brandt Commission in
1980 stated ‘the basis for any world or national order must be people
and respect for their essential rights’ deeming a state-centric, military
focused notion of security as unfit for the world.35 The Palme
Commission in 1982 introduced the idea of ‘‘common security’’ and
recognised that states need to consider both economic progress to
ensure the freedom from want and more traditional, military-based
notions of security to ensure the freedom from fear.36 However,
common security remained state-centric with the view that ‘all states
have the right to security.’37 The Brundtland Commission in 1987
coined the term ‘‘sustainable development’’ and importantly considered
the environment with analysis of available resources for the population,
34 Nasu, supra note 16, 29.
35 Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A Program for Survival
(MIT Press 1980) 268; Jean-Philippe Thérien, ‘Human Security: The Making of a UN Ideology’ (2012) 26(2)
Global Society 191–213, 197.
36 Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament – The Report of the Independent Commission on
Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme (Pan 1982) xii.
37 Hisashi Owada, ‘Human Security and International Law’ In: Ulrich Fastenrath, Rudolf Geiger, Daniel-
Erasmus Khan, Andreas Paulus, Sabine von Schorlemer, and Christoph Vedder (eds), From Bilateralism to
Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma (OUP 2011) 505–520, 507.
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food security challenges, different energy sources, and the environment
as a cause of conflict.38
The UNDP built on the work of the earlier commissions and
advanced the notion of ‘‘sustainable human development’’.39 Under a
new administrator, Gus Speth, the UNDP sought to be increasingly
involved in times of crisis aspiring to coordinate the UN’s peace
operations, political and humanitarian efforts, and development
efforts.40 Security became a concern for the UNDP because the needs
of people during different forms of emergencies, be it a natural disaster,
war, or humanitarian crisis, are inseparable from sustainable develop-
ment.41 The result was the 1994 iteration of the UNDP’s Human
Development Report which coined human security. The Report
attempted to create a vision of human security that could be adopted
by both states and the UN in furthering social development.42 The team
behind the Report sought to create an approach that ‘focuses on
building human capabilities to confront and overcome poverty,
illiteracy, diseases, discrimination, restrictions on political freedom,
and the threat to violent conflict.’43 The Report has been argued to
represent a ‘broader normative shift leading to the strengthening of the
position of individual human beings at the international scene.’44
Following the 1994 Report various middle powers including Canada,
Norway, and Japan adopted human security approaches in their foreign
policies.45 In 2001, the Commission on Human Security was created by
38 United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (OUP
1987).
39 See e.g. Craig N Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme A Better Way? (CUP 2006).
40 James Speth, ‘Challenges for Sustainable Human Development: Good Governance
and Democratization’ (Bruno Kriesky Forum for International Dialogue, Vienna, Austria, 1997) 7.
41 Murphy, supra note 39, 277.
42 UNDP, supra note 4, 24. See also, Des Gasper, ‘Securing Humanity: Situating ‘Human Security’ as
Concept and Discourse’ (2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 221–245.
43 Amitav Acharya, ‘Human Security’ In: John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), The
Globalisation of World Politics (OUP, 6th ed, 2014) 448–462, 449.
44 Veronika Bílkova, ‘Ensuring Human Security in Armed Conflicts: The Role of Non-State Actors and its
Reflection in Current International Humanitarian Law’ In: Cedric Ryngaert and Math Noortmann (eds),
Human Security and International Law (Intersensia 2014) 29–5, 30–1.
45 Tom Farer, ‘Human Security: Defining the Elephant and Imagining Its Tasks’ (2011) 1 Asian Journal of
International Law 43, 46. See e.g. Jennifer Moher, ‘Canada’s Human Security Agenda’ (Peacebuilding and
Human Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Canadian Government,
December 2012) \http://odihpn.org/magazine/canada%C2%92s-human-security-agenda/[; Department
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ‘Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World’ (April
1999) \http://www.summit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm[; Japanese Ministry of




Secretary-General Kofi Annan and published its Human Security Now
Report two years later.46 The Commission defined human security as:
to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human
freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental
freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from
critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using
processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating
political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that
together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.47
The definition places a focus on pervasive and widespread threats in an
attempt to narrow human security to the core threats to survival and
make the concept more practical for operationalisation.48 Following the
report, a number of human security-based initiatives were created
within the UN. Namely, a Human Security Unit (HSU) and an Advisory
Board for Human Security. The HSU in particular has helped promote
and institutionalise the human security concept within the UN.49
It is suggested here that human security is based upon five principles,
namely, (1) existing rights and norms, (2) a focus on the vital core
identified in a bottom-up manner, (3) a concern for vulnerability and
building resilience, (4) preventative protection, and (5) the empower-
ment of people to act on their own behalf and implement solutions to
security threats.50 Others have argued the human security discourse
requires a change in values for the international community but instead
the operationalisation of human security provides a new avenue by
which we can advance existing values and goals of the international
system and ensure that they serve the needs of individuals.51
Respect for international legal norms such as human rights law and
humanitarian law, the rule of law, accountability through legal
mechanisms, and good governance are inherent to human security.52
The Commission on Human Security argues a rights-based human
security approach ‘reorients humanitarian strategies towards enhancing
46 Commission on Human Security, supra note 4.
47 Ibid. 4.
48 Sabina Alkire, ‘A Vital Core that Must Be Treated with the Same Gravitas as Traditional Security
Threats’ (2004) 35 Security Dialogue 359, 360.
49 Thérien, supra note 35, 209.
50 This framework is set out in more detail by the author in Alexander Gilder, ‘Human Security and the
Stabilization Mandate of MINUSCA’ (2020) International Peacekeeping 1–32 https://doi.org/10.1080/
13533312.2020.1733423.
51 Matt McDonald, ‘Human Security and the Construction of Security’ (2002) 16 Global Society 277, 279.
52 Shireen Daft, The Relationship Between Human Security Discourse and International Law: A Principled
Approach (Routledge 2017) 5.
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people’s capabilities, choices and security.’53 The Commission articu-
lates the concept of human security as one which allows for informed
decision-making where human rights are examined in relation to a
range of actors involved, not through a state-centric perspective. In that
sense, human security can constructively refocus human rights
responses to reflect the public interest, and not solely in relation to
state obligations and state methods for realising rights.54 In general,
international law ‘must be at the heart of human security’ and the latter
encompasses disciplines of human rights law, humanitarian law,
international criminal law and refugee law.55 Those disciplines are
often seen in isolation and human security has the capacity to be a lens
by which international actors examine a situation and ensure a range of
legal regimes are used to protect individuals. By grounding human
security in existing legal regimes, it can be utilised to give a universal,
coherent framework that focuses the attention on protecting individuals
from immediate and pervasive threats identified by those affected.
Human security has been criticised in the past as ‘‘nothing more than
a shopping list’’ of wants and desires due to its wide-ranging definitions
where any number of issues are securitised.56 The co-chair of the
Commission on Human Security recognised that it would be wholly
impracticable to address all possible security issues identified by a
multitude of actors.57 To rectify this the Commission focused the
attention of human security on the ‘‘vital core’’ which is what people
hold to be the ‘‘essence of life’’ and ‘‘crucially important’’.58 Conse-
quently, the vital core is able to shift the focus on a needs basis for
different individuals and groups. The Commission’s definition of human
security, quoted above, speaks of ‘critical (severe) and pervasive
(widespread) threats and situations’ to denote a focus on security threats
which cut to the core a person’s activities and functions, and large-scale,
recurrent dangers.59 The vital core can be varied depending on what the
53 Commission on Human Security, supra note 4, 27.
54 Gerd Oberleitner, ‘Porcupines in love: the intricate convergence of human rights and human security’
(2005) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 588, 601–2; Christian Tomuschat, Between Idealism and Realism.
The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, Vol. 13/1 (Oxford University Press 2003) 56.
55 Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor, International Law and New Wars (OUP 2017) 565.
56 Keith Krause, ‘The Key to a Powerful Agenda, If Properly Delimited’ (2004) 35 Security Dialogue 367.
57 Sadako Ogata, ‘From State Security to Human Security’ (26 May 2002, Ogden Lecture, Brown
University) 4 (on file with the author).
58 Commission on Human Security, supra note 4, 4.




individuals and groups affected deem to be essence of their lives. In this
way security is personalised and not rigid based on what the
international community, and consequently states, determine to be
the most critical and pervasive threats. If a human security approach
was adopted, international actors such as the UN would need to seek
views of individuals and groups to ascertain the core factors
undermining security in a given crisis. The international actor
concerned can then provide a response which will lead to meaningful
improvements in the eyes of those affected.
The Commission further identified that particular groups can be
disproportionately affected by security threats. Namely, people on the
move, women, children, the elderly, the disabled, the indigenous, and
the missing.60 When, in 2012, the UN General Assembly defined human
security vulnerable people were singled out as being of particular
concern.61 However, human security demands more than merely
identifying where a group could be at exceptional risk. Martha Fineman
has argued that the partial antidote to vulnerability is resilience.
Resilience is defined as ‘what provides an individual with the means and
ability to recover from harm or setbacks.’62 To embody a human
security approach international actors would need to first identify the
peculiarities of vulnerability in a given situation and second contribute
to building resilience which would ultimately address the root cause of
the vulnerability. For instance, the UN regularly empowers women to
participate in politics which within a society where women have
traditionally been subjugated could alleviate vulnerability in the long-
term.
The final two principles, preventative protection and empowerment,
are advanced to ensure people are shielded from severe and widespread
threats on the one hand and on the other that people’s opportunities are
enhanced and built upon to provide a future situation where individuals
and communities are more resilient to threats. Protection may need to
be offered to combat a range of threats, not only physical harm, and
protection responses should be preventative where possible.63 Human
60 Commission on Human Security, supra note 4.
61 UN General Assembly, ‘Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome’, (25 October 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/290, [3(a)] (emphasis added).
62 Martha Fineman, ‘Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth’ (2014) 23 Temple Political & Civil Rights
Law Review 307, 320. See also, Martha Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 1.
63 Commission on Human Security, supra note 4, 11.
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security has a concern for more than threats of violence and as such
protection must go further than ensuring only physical integrity. Instead
an intervention could address foreseen health or environmental crises
and use institution building programmes to build the capacity of the
state in question to be better prepared for future risks.
The empowerment aspect of the Commission’s framework is
thought to have more potential and shows how human security can
respond to crises in a legitimate and focused way compared to existing
security practices.64 Where people are adequately protected, they can
be empowered to ‘make better choices, and actively prevent and
mitigate the impact of insecurities.’65 The Commission argues that
where people are empowered they can address issues locally and can
mobilise others by gaining international attention for food shortages
or protest human rights violations. Today over half of the world have
access to the internet which gives an unprecedented opportunity for
individuals to be empowered and use the internet to gain global
attention for an ongoing security issue. A notable, and inspiring
example is that of Alaa Salah, a student who led protests against
former President Omar al-Bashir’s regime in early-2019. Photographs
and videos of Salah gained worldwide attention first on social media
and later in mainstream news media outlets. Salah helped mobilise a
large number of people in opposition to al-Bashir’s government and
the image was dubbed ‘‘the Image of the Revolution’’.66 Powerful
examples such as this demonstrate the power of social media in
communicating concerns of populations to a wider audience across
the globe.
4 Can human security make international law more responsive
to human need?
It has previously been argued that human security is a concept which is
not useful for policymaking because its competing policy goals are too
difficult to reconcile.67 One author notes it ‘has so far proven largely
64 Ogata, supra note 57, 5.
65 Sadako Ogata, ‘The Human Security Commission’s strategy’ (2004) 16 Peace Review 25, 26.
66 Vanessa Friedman, ‘It’s Going to Be the Image of the Revolution’ (New York Times, 10 April 2019)
\https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/fashion/demonstration-clothing-women-sudan.html[.
67 Roland Paris, ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’ (2001) 26(2) International Security 87, 88.
124 A. Gilder
123
unworkable in practice.’68 However, it has conversely been claimed that
the UN, with regards to peace operations, have been working on a
human security-based agenda since 1999 regardless of the fact the term
is absent from major policy documents.69 In addition, the UN has been
said to have responsibility for an integrated approach to human security
and ultimately ‘promote a positive concept [of peace] by addressing the
underlying conditions and prerequisites for a stable and durable
peace.’70
In a kaleidoscopic world, the legitimacy of actors such as the UN and
states are increasingly challenged. The question becomes, are the
current international institutions and legal system fit for purpose? As
noted above, international law has developed into a system more
focused on humanity and the position of individuals.71 Emmanuelle
Jouannet, for example, argues that international law has become more
than a means of social regulation, and is ‘becoming used to transform
international society in order to make up for economic, social or
equitable imbalances.’72 However, it has been predicted that over the
coming decades international law will find it difficult to formally
incorporate the diverse and innumerable non-state actors involved in
this transformation into international institutions and legal processes.73
Human security would give guidance and orientation to international
actors allowing them to engage with non-state actors and ultimately
provide better preventative protection and the alleviation of vulnera-
bilities.74 A human security approach would seek to respond to global
problems by ensuring bottom-up engagement with local actors and
decentralising decision-making to open up discussions with a multitude
of parties in the interests of increased legitimacy and accountability.
68 Fairlie Chappuis, ‘Human Security and Security Sector Reform’ In: Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias
Kettemann and Markus Möstl (eds), Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management
(Routledge 2011) 99.
69 Wolfgang Benedek, ‘Mainstreaming human security in United Nations and European Union peace and
crisis management operations’ In: Wolfgang Benedek, Matthias Kettemann and Markus Möstl (eds),
Mainstreaming Human Security in Peace Operations and Crisis Management (Routledge 2011) 13–31, 19.
70 Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, ‘United Nations Peace Operations and International Law: What Kind of
Law Promotes What Kind of Peace?’ In: Cecilia Marcela Bailliet and Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, Promoting
Peace through International Law (OUP 2015) 302–3.
71 See e.g. Trindade, supra note 10; Teitel, supra note 11.
72 Emmanuelle Jouannet, What Is the Use of International Law? International law as a 21st Century
Guardian of Welfare’ (2006–2007) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 815, 821.
73 Sari and Jachec-Neale, supra note 8, v.
74 Benedek, supra note 69, 16.
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How human security is utilised, ‘all depends on what human security
is understood to be: a political agenda for governments, a rallying cry
that forges ad hoc or sustained coalitions of states on single issues, a
common concern that brings together single-issue civil society groups
under a uniting umbrella, an academic problem, or a new research
category.’75 Human security is described as a concept by most literature.
Therefore, human security is a collection of interrelated ideas and can
be a guide to interpretation. Specifically, as an agenda-setting concept, it
determines what are the most relevant issues and brings to the forefront
neglected problems that have previously not been included in national
and international security debates or have been on the periphery.
Barbara von Tigerstrom has said that human security is ‘a concept that
is designed to be used in a variety of ways, including in the
interpretation and development of legal norms.’76 Furthermore, Gerd
Oberleitner claims that ‘a human security approach to international law
can reinforce and strengthen attempts to bring international law into
line with the requirements of today’s world.’77 By using human security
as an agenda-setting concept international actors will be able to react to
the needs of individuals and provide effective responses that solidify the
continued relevance of international law.
Following on from the arguments of von Tigerstrom and Oberleit-
ner, Shireen Daft argues that human security can be a ‘synthesised
overarching framework’.78 Daft says that human security can have legal
character by serving as a framework for the expression of existing
norms with human security providing a principled future direction for
how international law tackles security threats.79 Daft believes this is
possible if clear principles of human security are articulated with roots
and relevance in existing international law.80 Daft’s argument lends well
to the current position of states since most believe human security
should be pursued under existing international legal frameworks and
not through new legal obligations.81 Australia has already advanced the
view that human security can provide a normative framework which
75 Oberleitner, supra note 54, 592–3.
76 Barbara von Tigerstrom, Human Security and International Law (Hart 2007) 42.
77 Gerd Oberleitner, ‘Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?’ (2005) 11(2) Global Governance
185, 186 (emphasis added).
78 Daft, supra note 52, 33.
79 Ibid. 33, 125.
80 Ibid. 86.
81 Nasu, supra note 16, 37.
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can ensure collective actions are providing preventative protection,
empowerment to build resilience, and direct benefits to populations.82
Other states agreed with, for example, Qatar arguing that by using a
framework for human security states will be compelled to be
proactive.83 Likewise, India stated that human security can be
implemented and used as a framework to respond to current challenges,
not only as a policy goal.84 If human security is not to be a legal concept
in its own right what it can do is harness existing international law to
pursue human-centric operational goals.85
A human-centred approach to international law is already evident in a
number of developments over the last couple of decades. For instance,
the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child have been argued to embody a shift toward
giving greater importance to human security as opposed to national
security.86 However, Hitoshi Nasu notes that the adoption of human-
centred treaties does not necessarily mean the concept of human security
is being implemented because states may simply address issues they
consider a threat, in a manner they consider appropriate, while not
taking into consideration the views of individuals facing insecurity.87
To counter this deficiency, it is proposed in this paper that
international law can be focused toward the inclusion of individual
views on insecurity by the UN implementing a conceptual framework
of human security. Due to shared goals there is direct relevance of
human security for the UN and the organisation represents an ideal
vehicle for implementing a human security framework. The UN has
long advanced the needs of individuals and a sophisticated international
human rights framework, development programmes, and the protec-
tion of civilians by UN peacekeeping forces are evidence of this. It could
be criticised that the implementation of human security is an
unattainable Utopian goal but involving individuals as participants,
using preventative methods of protection, and empowering people to
82 UN General Assembly, ‘Follow-up to the Millennium Summit’ (4 June 2012) A/66/PV.112, 10.
83 Ibid. 2.
84 Ibid. 14.
85 Math Noortmann and Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Towards a (New) Human Security-Based Agenda for
International Law and Non-State Actors’ In: Cedric Ryngaert and Math Noortmann (eds), Human Security
and International Law (Intersensia 2014) 195–203, 198.
86 Nasu, supra note 16, 33.
87 Ibid. 33.
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be involved in security processes are, on some level, achievable facets of
the human security concept. A human security framework would allow
the UN to adapt to future security developments in the face of a new
breed of crises brought by an interconnected and globalised world. In
addition, the framework would provide consistency of approach by
using a core set of individual-focused principles as the backbone of the
organisation’s activities.
A conceptual framework of human security, in a similar manner to
that argued by Daft, should be applied to the activities of the UN and
importantly the resolutions of the General Assembly and Security
Council. The principles of human security (i.e. its basis as a rights-based
concept, the vital core, recognition of vulnerability, and preventative
protection and empowerment) can have transformative potential as a
conceptual framework. Human security is transformative because ‘[i]t is
an idea that seeks to reopen analysis of the world’s priorities, to produce
new integrated methodologies in analysing the most complex and
pressing problems, and to give greater voice to individuals and
communities in searching for solutions.’88 Human security does not
entail additional legal obligations on the part of states but does
represent an alternate expression of existing legal principles to create an
approach where individuals are the referent object of security.
Individuals may then determine which threats to security, and
consequently related legal rights, require the immediate attention of
the international community.
Under such a framework, the UN and its member states can open an
equal dialogue with national, regional, and local actors to determine if
efforts in a broad range of security-related areas are ‘having unintended
negative effects on people’s security ‘‘on the ground’’ in spite of good
intentions, or whether they are achieving the goals articulated in terms
of benefit to affected populations.’89 Also, decision making, for instance
by the Security Council, may not explicitly threaten human security but
choices may be made that do not reflect the immediate needs of
individuals and not respect human security. Resources may not be used
most efficiently to the benefit of empowering individuals and reducing
their vulnerability. It has previously been claimed that the ‘ability to link
diverse issues and encourage a coordinated approach constitutes the
88 Daft, supra note 52, 82.
89 von Tigerstrom, supra note 76, 49.
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most important contribution of a human security approach.’90 Drawing
on Benedek’s belief that human security and human rights should not
be used interchangeably but can ‘‘redefine and refine’’ our approaches to
peace, security and human rights, a conceptual framework of human
security has a role to play in the international community.
The implementation of a human security approach must be
undertaken across the full spectrum of actors. At the UN-level, the
UN General Assembly has adopted a definition of the concept and has
also held a thematic debates on the subject.91 However, it is the UN
Security Council which has the primary responsibility to maintain
international peace and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter and
can take action under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter to either settle
a dispute through peaceful means or take enforcement measures to
maintain or restore international peace and security.92 Therefore, the
Security Council is unique in its position to articulate threats to
international peace and security, advance what it deems to be an
important agenda, and coordinate a human security approach.93 Trina
Ng suggests that if the Security Council adopted a framework of human
security then its interpretation of international peace and security would
be radically altered resulting in a limitless expanded application of
Chapter VII.94 While it is true human security would affect what the
Security Council recognises as a serious threat or acute danger it would
be doing so on the basis of bottom-up information from individuals and
civil society. In a time where non-state actors are calling for action on
various global issues it is suggested here that the Security Council
should engage with a broader notion of security that is responsive to the
needs of individuals even if the application of Chapter VII is altered.
90 Ibid. 46.
91 UN General Assembly, Informal Thematic Debate on Human Security (22 May 2008)\https://www.
un.org/humansecurity/reports-resolutions/[; UN General Assembly, Informal Thematic Debate on
Human Security (14 April 2011)\https://www.un.org/humansecurity/reports-resolutions/[; UN General
Assembly, Informal Thematic Debate on Human Security (18 June 2014) \https://www.un.org/
humansecurity/reports-resolutions/[.
92 N.b. the General Assembly can seize itself of a matter of international peace and security under certain
circumstances. The ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution (Resolution 377A (3 November 1950)) states that in a
situation where the Security Council is unable to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security then the General Assembly may immediately consider the matter at hand
and make recommendations to maintain or restore international peace and security. This was used in 1956
to create UNEF I but missions are, under most circumstances, created by the UN Security Council under the
auspices of Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter.
93 Daft, supra note 52, 71.
94 Trina Ng, ‘Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World: A Role for the Security Council’
(2010) 15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 275, 280.
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States are a necessary adjunct to any security action taken by the
Security Council as states are the ultimate decision makers in the
procedure of the Council and troops must be contributed by states for
collective security action. As such, a human security approach at the UN
would necessarily need to be acceptable to states. A potential threat to
this support is the above mentioned scepticism that human security
should not entail additional legal obligations or erode state sovereignty.
However, this is not the case as Barry Buzan reiterates that, states are a
‘necessary condition for individual security because without the state it
is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of individuals.’95
Human security is, in the first instance, provided by states. States
must consider that they are sovereign only so long as they are effective
in developing conditions and preventing conflict to provide for the well-
being of individuals under their control.96 Human security does not
disregard the importance of state infrastructure and provisions for
protecting its own population. Instead, ‘strengthening the function of
states is the major course of human security.’97 Where a state is failing
and its institutions no longer functioning there can be profound damage
to human security.98 The second level of human security is the
responsibility of actors such as the UN to act in defence of human
security where a state fails to do so. This second level is where the use
of a human security framework by the UN Security Council fits in. The
third tier of human security is where empowered individuals, commu-
nities, and civil society provide for their own security. This is where
people themselves become involved in the participatory process of
security.99 That is to say, individuals are active subjects in identifying
and implementing solutions to security issues.100 This can be under-
taken by individuals being given platforms to voice security concerns
and the proposal of solutions, especially in post-conflict situations where
95 Barry Buzan, ‘Human Security in International Perspective’ In: Mely Caballero-Anthony, Jawhar
Hassan (eds), The Asia Pacific in the New Millennium: Political and Security Challenges (Institute of Strategic and
International Studies 2001) 583–96.
96 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, ‘Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application to Post-
Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan’ (Les Études du CERI No. 117–118, Sciences Po, 2005) 9. See also,
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Anuradha Chenoy, Human Security: concepts and implications (Routledge 2007).
97 Hideaki Shinoda, ‘The Concept of Human Security: Historical and Theoretical Implications’ (IPSHU
English Research Report Series No. 19, Conflict and Human Security: A Search for New Approaches of
Peace-building, 2004) 13.





a society is being rebuilt.101 The next section will provide an example of
UN practice which can be informed by the concept of human security
to include bottom-up engagement and an inclusive decision-making
process which recognises individuals as valuable participants.
5 Human security in UN peace operations
A conceptual framework of human security could have a profound
effect on the mandating of peace operations by involving meaningful
engagement with individuals. This is an ideal example since UN
missions in the field are necessarily engaged in activities with local
communities and national reconciliation efforts that would benefit from
a bottom-up, human security approach to decision-making and mandate
implementation. It has previously been argued by Howe, Kondock and
Spijkers that while peace operation mandates do not use the language of
human security they are impacted by the UN’s wider human security
agenda which includes the protection of civilians, R2P and pursuit of the
Millennium Development Goals.102 This conclusion though conflates
the distinct concept of ‘human security’ with other principles. Mainly
drawing on examples from the United Nations Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the
Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the beginnings of a human
security approach at the UN is described with a discussion of how this
could be developed further under a conceptual framework.
Section 3 outlined five principles of human security. By applying an
analytical framework based upon those principles it is possible to see (1)
where peace operations have sought to carry out their activities in line
with human rights and the rule of law; (2) where space is provided to
identify the vital core; (3) where vulnerabilities are identified and
building resilience has been attempted; (4) what aspects of protection
are focused on by the missions; and (5) if individuals are empowered to
act on their own behalf and implement solutions to security threats.
Both MINUSMA and MINUSCA have carried out a number of
activities aimed at promoting human rights and establishing the rule of
law. MINUSMA has been directly involved in the training of Malian
101 Ibid. 25.
102 Brendan Howe, Boris Kondock and Otto Spijkers, ‘Normative and Legal Challenges to UN
Peacekeeping Operations’ (2015) 19 Journal of International Peacekeeping 1–31, 30.
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Defence and Security forces and police since 2013 and understands
‘long-term reconciliation will not be possible without the promotion
and defence of the human rights of all communities in the north.’103
The focus on human rights, both as a task to assist the Malian
authorities with and as a monitoring and reporting task for the UN, has
since been carried over into each renewal of MINUSMA’s mandate.104
As for MINUSCA, human rights and extending the rule of law forms a
crucial part of its mandate with the mission working to revitalise the
justice system in the wake of widespread human rights abuses and
sexual violence. A hybrid Special Criminal Court has been established to
try ‘serious crimes, including serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law, including conflict-related sexual vio-
lence as well as grave violations of the rights of the child, that constitute
a threat to peace, stability or security’.105 Both missions have also
sought to re-establish the rule of law by training judges and magistrates
and reopening courts with the ultimate goal of ending impunity.106
Implementation of the vital core would allow the UN to determine
what is crucially important for local people to be able to respond in a
bottom-up manner. Missions can demonstrate a concern for the vital
core by opening space for dialogue with individuals. Prior to
MINUSMA’s deployment the UN’s preliminary assessment mission
held talks with ‘a broad cross section of Malian society’ to make
recommendations for how the UN can provide assistance.107 A key
method of engaging with communities in both MINUSMA and
MINUSCA has been through the use of community liaison assistants
(CLAs). CLAs aim to improve communication with local communities
and to gain ‘a better understanding of the population’s concerns and
expectations of the Mission’ and are ‘critical links’ between the mission
103 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (10 June 2013) UN
Doc S/2013/338 [40, 82]; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali’ (26
December 2017) UN Doc S/2017/1105 [49]; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the
Situation in Mali’ (28 September 2017) UN Doc S/2017/811 [47].
104 UN Security Council, Resolution 2227 (29 June 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2227 [14(e)]; UN Security
Council, Resolution 2295 (29 June 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2295 [19(f)]; UN Security Council, Resolution 2364
(29 June 2017) UN Doc S/RES/2364 [20(f)].
105 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 19 December 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council’ (22 December 2014) S/2014/928 [63].
106 See e.g. UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African
Republic’ (1 April 2015) S/2015/227 [47]; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the
situation in Mali’ (9 June 2014) UN Doc S/2014/403 [28]; S/2017/811, supra note 103, [59].
107 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (28 November 2012)
UN Doc S/2012/894 [12].
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and communities in remote areas.108 CLAs speak the local language, can
find out the risks to communities, act as mediators, and communicate
outcomes to both civilian and military contingents of an operation.
CLAs are able to work with communities to formulate protection
strategies and alert mechanisms for community security.109 Through to
2017 MINUSMA remained committed to improving ‘community
outreach’ in the north to respond to the needs of the local
population.110 However, it is worth noting that while the missions
contain examples of community outreach it is unclear to what extent
local views on security in actuality inform the Security Council’s
decisions on mandate priorities or the UN’s decisions on what initiatives
it will pursue within the country as part of the mandate.
The concept of human security recognises vulnerability as a crucial
factor in decision-making. The mandates of MINUSMA and MINUSCA
typically recognise the vulnerability of women and children and call for
specific protection and the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and
Women Protection Advisors.111 Other groups have been identified as
vulnerable in Mali and the CAR such as displaced persons,112 the
elderly,113 disabled,114 and Muslim communities.115 To what extent
resilience is built is another matter. Resilience can be read into some
UN activities such as the creation of employment opportunities for
young people, the promotion of gender equality, and the involvement
of women in the peace process.116 However, the focus of the UN
remains on protection rather than resilience building initiatives.
Both MINUSMA and MINUSCA have protection of civilian (PoC)
mandates. For a human security-based analysis the question is whether
108 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (22 September 2015)
UN Doc S/2015/732 [33]; UN Security Council, ‘Situation in the Central African Republic’ (18 June 2018)
S/2018/611 [40].
109 UN Security Council, ‘Situation in the Central African Republic’ (1 April 2016) S/2016/305 [26].
110 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali’ (6 June 2017) UN Doc
S/2017/478 [64].
111 See e.g. UN Security Council, Resolution 2100 (25 April 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2100 [16(c)(ii)].
112 Ibid. [2]; UN Security Council, Resolution 2164 (25 June 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2164 [16].
113 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted
pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)’ (3 March 2014) S/2014/142 [14].
114 UN Security Council, Resolution 2217 (28 April 2015) S/RES/2217, 4.
115 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 29 January 2015 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council’ (29 January 2015) S/2015/85, 2; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic’ (29 July 2015) S/2015/576 [20].
116 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (28 March 2014) UN
Doc S/2014/229 [46]; Helené Lackenbauer, Magdalena Tham Lindell and Gabriella Ingerstad, ‘‘‘If our men
won’t fight, we will’’ A Gendered Analysis of the Armed Conflict in Northern Mali’ (Swedish Defence
Research Agency, November 2015, FOI-R-4121-SE) 43.
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the PoC mandates take preventative action and look beyond only
physical harm. The PoC mandates themselves specify the protection of
civilians ‘under imminent threat of physical violence’.117 The missions
have utilised so-called ‘robust’ force to establish control of territory and
deter armed groups from harming civilians.118 In one sense this can be
seen as preventative as the UN is taking steps to mitigate harm to
civilians. Another key area of protection for the missions is the
prevention of sexual violence and abuse against women and children by
providing training to a multitude of actors and assisting the host
governments with introducing preventative measures.119 The missions
clearly focus on physical protection but wider human security concerns
can be seen where vulnerabilities identified above are linked to the type
of protection offered, as with preventing sexual violence against women
and children.
Empowerment requires giving agency to local people to be able to
make choices for their future and demand improvements which
enhances their security. The UN has made a concerted effort to
empower women in Mali and the CAR to have active roles in the peace
process and national politics.120 The Security Council acknowledges ‘the
significant contribution that women can have in conflict prevention,
peace building and mediation efforts.’121 The missions have also
undertaken and supported actions that provide space for people to be
empowered to act on their own behalf in identifying and implementing
solutions to the crisis. For instance, local peace and reconciliation
committees, initially established by MINUSCA in 2015, contain elected
persons from within a community and ‘are expected to solve local
conflicts and promote peace through mediation and dialogue.’122 This is
117 S/RES/2100, supra note 111, [16(c)(i)]; UN Security Council, Resolution 2149 (10 April 2014) S/RES/
2149 [30(a)].
118 On the topic of robust force see e.g. Alexander Gilder, ‘The Effect of ‘Stabilization’ in the Mandates
and Practice of UN Peace Operations’ (2019) Netherlands International Law Review 66(1) 47–73.
119 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali’ (1 October 2013) UN
Doc S/2013/582 [44]; UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 29 July 2016 from the Permanent Representatives
of Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General’ (8 August 2016) UN Doc S/2016/682, 3; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the
Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (30 December 2016) UN Doc S/2016/1137 [37]; UN Security
Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic’ (1 August 2014)
S/2014/562 [48]; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central
African Republic’ (28 November 2014) S/2014/857 [45]; S/2015/227, supra note 106, [45].
120 S/RES/2149, supra note 117, [30(b)(v)]; S/RES/2100, supra note 111, [16(b)(iii), 25]; S/RES/2295, supra
note 104, [26].
121 UN Security Council, Resolution 2056 (5 July 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2056 [26].
122 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African
Republic’ (1 February 2017) S/2017/94 [21].
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remarkably similar to the human security aim of giving people the
ability to act on their own behalf and on the behalf of others.123 Local
peace committee activities have run community awareness campaigns,
reopened markets, and facilitated dialogue between farmers and herders
to resolve differences peacefully.124
Human security is undeniably a difficult concept to quantify. Though
the examples above outline some areas of current UN practice which do
operationalise aspects of human security. However, there is much more
which could be achieved with the application of a conceptual
framework for human security. For instance, there is an overwhelming
focus of UN peace operations on protecting individuals from physical
harm. Human security goes beyond physical protection and necessitates
a concern for harms rooted in, for example, environmental, health, or
economic causes. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) did provide
support during an Ebola outbreak but more could have been done in
this regard.125 The Security Council declared the Ebola outbreak in 2014
a threat to international peace and security and took a major leadership
role during the crisis.126 That being said, UN peace operations operating
in affected areas did not have their mandates modified to include the
new concern for health security. Under a conceptual framework for
human security, the protection of health security would have become a
key concern for the UN missions in response to local needs in areas hit
by the Ebola virus. Going further, if UN peace operations adopted the
conceptual framework there would not need to be a global pandemic to
result in UN attention on health threats. Instead, UN missions in the
field would actively work on improving access to health services with
other partners if that need is identified by a local population.
Value can be added to UN peace operations by orientating practice
toward initiatives like informing decision-making with local views on
security needs, the building of resilience to a range of vulnerabilities,
and allowing for dialogue within communities as well as the empow-
erment of local people to engage on national and international levels.
Under the conceptual framework, UN missions would need to explicitly
identify and plan initiatives that build resilience and prioritise
123 Commission on Human Security, supra note 4, 11.
124 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic’ (2 June 2017)
S/2017/473 [21].
125 Sara E Davies and Simon Rushton, ‘Public health emergencies: a new peacekeeping mission? Insights
from UNMIL’s role in the Liberia Ebola outbreak’ (2016) 37(3) Third World Quarterly 419–435.
126 UN Security Council, Resolution 2177 (18 September 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2177.
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empowerment at the local level to ensure communities are able to
resolve conflict peacefully and engage with national reconciliation.
While the UN implements some wider empowerment related strate-
gies, either on its own or in partnership with host governments, they do
not feature as focal points of mission examples given above. Empow-
erment is fundamental for the international actor to gain a local-level
understanding of the conflict and interlinkages between security threats
and a conceptual framework for human security would assist the UN in
achieving meaningful empowerment. This case study has served as a
starting point for international lawyers to begin to consider and visualise
how the concept of human security could be further implemented in
other UN activities and the application of international law with
individuals as participants.
6 Conclusion
The concept of human security can be a valuable tool to reorientate
international law, and importantly the work of the UN, toward a
human-centric notion of security. By doing this, international law
would remain legitimate in the face of declining state-centric attitudes
and would be able to respond to new security challenges in the
interlinked kaleidoscopic world. Human security would allow new
actors to penetrate the international system and ensure that the existing
structures remain legitimate in a time where coalitions and decen-
tralised global movements are ever present. Particularly in situations of
conflict, it is crucial that the voices of local communities, national
groups and other non-state actors are able to access the global discourse
in a formal manner as opposed to relying on social media traction to
garner attention for their concerns. The earlier mentioned example of
Sudan is one success story of how social media influenced the
international community’s discussion of a crisis. However, there are
countless other conflicts which to do not attract the same level of
attention.
A conceptual framework of human security would provide space for
the UN to engage with non-state actors in a meaningful way. The
example of peace operations shows the beginnings of an approach that
implicitly takes into account the principles of human security. The
implementation of these principles could be expanded to ensure
international responses and decision-making are locally-informed and
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prepare communities for future security threats. A conceptual frame-
work of human security would provide an approach in which the UN,
and states, could achieve human-centric, locally-informed peace in a
globalised and interconnected world where individuals are able to
permeate international discourse more than ever before. There are of
course many unanswered questions and other scholars may wish to
continue this debate by linking the conceptual framework to TWAIL
scholarship, the women peace and security agenda, critiques of liberal
peacebuilding, and much more.
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